Computational Science Technical Note CSTN-081


Roles of Space and Geometry in the Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma

K. A. Hawick and C. J. Scogings

Archived May 2009


The spatial prisoners' dilemma is a useful model in stochastic game theory that can help probe spatial complexity classes and quantify macroscopic emergent properties. Repeated simulation experiments with different temptation payoff parameter values and with varying initial proportions of defector players indicate a detailed structure in phase space that exhibits sharp transitions regardless of the spatial dimension and grid geometry employed. These edges appear to be a complex but natural consequence of the spatial prisoners' dilemma and similar models. Applying a damping or self-weight to the choice of game strategy employed also shifts the edges in parameter space. This article presents detailed results from numerical experiments on the spatial prisoner dilemma model and discusses implications for other stochastic spatial game theory agent systems.

Keywords: game theory; stochastic agents; prisoner dilemma; phase transition; adaptive strategy.

Full Document Text: PDF version.

Citation Information: BiBTeX database for CSTN Notes.

BiBTeX reference:

  author = {K. A. Hawick and C. J. Scogings},
  title = {Roles of Space and Geometry in the Spatial Prisoners' Dilemma},
  booktitle = {IASTED Int. Conference on Modelling, Simulation and Identification
  year = {2009},
  pages = {659-010-1-6},
  address = {Beijing, China},
  month = {12-14 October},
  publisher = {IASTED},
  note = {659-010},
  timestamp = {2009.09.06}

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